THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
JOINT STATEMENT ON STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR SECURITY BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscored that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening global strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. Multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban have begun. The Presidents noted the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in ensuring global stability.
President Yeltsin outlined the initiative Russia presented to the UN General Assembly for a treaty among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council for a halt to the production of fissile materials for weapons; a ban on the reuse of fissile materials in weapons; further elimination of nuclear warheads; and reduction of strategic delivery systems.
President Clinton outlined the ideas he described at the UN General Assembly for cooperation in advancing nuclear non- proliferation, particularly to enhance the security of nuclear materials and to prevent nuclear smuggling.
The Presidents discussed these initiatives, of which they had informed each other in advance and which therefore reflected shared goals and certain common proposals designed to contribute to nuclear non- proliferation. In this regard, the Presidents agreed that the permanent members of the UN Security Council, given their responsibilities as nuclear powers, have a special role to play.
The United States and Russia will work with the other permanent members, as well as other countries, to ensure a successful outcome at the 1995 Non- Proliferation Treaty conference that produces an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty at the earliest possible date, and to achieve a global prohibition on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The Presidents also agreed on the desirability of continuing their respective moratoria on nuclear weapon tests.
The Presidents welcomed the ongoing deactivation and dismantlement of strategic nuclear systems by the parties to the START I Treaty and the implementation of the January 14, 1994 Trilateral Statement. They welcomed the real possibility to bring the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol into force in the very near future and pledged full cooperation to this end. The Presidents agreed that their defense ministers would exchange information every three months on strategic systems that have been deactivated and eliminated.
The Presidents confirmed their intention to seek early ratification of the START II Treaty, once the START I Treaty enters into force, and expressed their desire to exchange START II instruments of ratification at the next U.S.- Russia summit meeting.
In an important new development, the Presidents agreed that, once the START II Treaty is ratified, the United States and Russia will proceed to deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from combat status.
The Presidents instructed their experts to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation and to the current spirit of U.S.-Russian partnership, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces. They also discussed the prospect for confidence-building and transparency measures in this area. The Presidents consider that, as the political partnership develops, there will be new opportunities to strengthen stability through openness and transparency.
President Clinton described to President Yeltsin the uni- lateral adjustments the United States will make in its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces and safety, security and use control practices as a result of the recently completed nuclear posture review. President Yeltsin noted these U.S. changes as a manifestation of the new relationship between the United States and Russia and described the comparable review of measures underway in Russia to reduce Russian nuclear forces and improve their safety. The Presidents agreed that each side would independently consider further unilateral steps, as appropriate, with regard to their respective nuclear forces.
The Presidents agreed on the fundamental importance of preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty. Noting the recent progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and multilateralization of the ABM Treaty, the Presidents instructed their respective delegations, working with the other participating states, to complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time.
Both sides have an interest in developing and fielding effective theater missile defense systems on a cooperative basis. The Presidents agreed that the two sides will conduct a joint exercise of theater missile defenses and early warning. This exercise would contribute to providing a basis for U.S. and Russian forces to operate together, for example, in peacekeeping operations.
Proceeding from the principles of partnership and reciprocity, the Presidents agreed to work together to develop broad bilateral and multilateral cooperation on assuring nuclear security. They agreed to:
Cooperate on a bilateral and multilateral basis, including through the exchange of appropriate information, to prevent illegal trade in nuclear materials and undertake measures to strengthen the regime control and physical protection of such materials.
Exchange detailed information at the next meeting
of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on aggregate
stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of
fissile materials and on their safety and security.
The sides will develop a process
for exchanging this information on a regular basis.
Direct their joint working group on nuclear safeguards, transparency and irreversibility to pursue by March 1995 further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons.
Facilitate broad cooperation among appropriate agencies in both countries to ensure effective control, accounting and physical protection of nuclear materials.
Facilitate cooperative programs between U.S. and Russian national laboratories in the areas of safety, physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials.
Deepen cooperation between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense in the area of ensuring nuclear security.
Implement a joint plan to expedite construction of a new, long-term storage facility for fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons at Mayak.
Taking a broad view of strategic stability and bearing in mind the need to control all types of weapons of mass destruction, the Presidents agreed on:
The importance of continued, full, mutual and reciprocal implementation of the September 1992 U.S.-Russian-UK statement on Biological Weapons as a means of gaining confidence that offensive biological weapons programs have been terminated.
The need for adherence by all states to the Chemical Weapons Convention and for universal application of its provisions, as well as the need for adoption without delay of measures that make it possible to bring the CWC into force; and the need to resolve without delay the outstanding issues related to the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding.